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THE INTERSECTION
OF DELAWARE
The rules for Delaware statutory trusts are separate and apart from the rules for
tenancies-in-common.
AND TENANCIES-
IN-COMMON
RICHARD M. LIPTON, ARNOLD HARRISON, and TODD D. GOLUB
erry Cuff is a well-known expertin the area of like-kind exchanges,I and he has graced tax profession-
als with numerous articles on the
subject.1 Thus, it is unusual to
read one of his articles and conclude that it is
wrong. However, Terry's recent article in these
pages (hereafter referred to as "the prior arti-
cle"),2 requires a response, In the authors' view,
Terry glossed over the distinctions between a
Delaware statutory trust (DST) and a tenancy-
in-common (TIC) arrangement by indicating
that the rules concerning the latter are also rel-
evant to the former.
As described in more detail below, the
rules concerning DSTs and TICs arise under
separate provisions of the regulations. More-
over, they have little in common except that an
interest in either may constitute an interest in
property for purposes of Section 1031. In this
regard, the IRS had to issue two separate
authorities to provide guidance on how and
when an interest in a DST and a TIC can be used
as like-kind property in an exchange under Sec-
tion 1031. The first guidance issued was Rev.
RICHARD M. LIPTON and TODD D. GOLUB are part-
ners in the Chicago office of Baker & McKenzie LLP.
ARNOLD HARRISON is a partner in the Chicago office
of Jenner & Block LLP.
Proc. 2002-22' ("the TIC Rev. Proc."), which
sets out the guidelines under which the IRS will
consider issuing private rulings that a TIC con-
stitutes a direct interest in real property, and
not an interest in a business entity under Reg.
1.7701-3.
The second guidance was Rev. Rul. 2004-86"
("the DST Ruling"), which addressed whether
a trust will be treated as a trust under Reg.
1.7701-4 or will be classified as a business entity
under Reg. 1.7701-3. If an entity is classified
as a trust, and the trust also satisfies the
requirements of a grantor trust under Section
671, interests in that trust will be treated as inter-
ests in the property owned by the trust for pur-
poses of applying Section 1031. In contrast, if
the trust is treated as a business entity, inter-
ests in the trust will be treated as interests in
a partnership or corporation (under Reg.
1.7701-3), which will not constitute valid
replacement property under Sections
1031(a)(2)(D) and (E).
The TIC Rev. Proc. and the DST Ruling pro-
vide guidance on when interests in a TIC and
a DST can be interests in real property, and not
interests in an entity. However, the DST Rul-
ing (which was released after the TIC Rev. Proc.)
does not indicate that the requirements of both
must be satisfied when an interest in a DST is
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acquired. It is silent on this point. Neverthe-
less, the prior article concluded that anytime
a DST is used in a like-kind exchange under
Section 1031, the requirements of both the TIC
Rev. Proc. and the DST Ruling must be satis-
fied.
While it is unfortunate that the IRS did not
specifically address the interaction of the TIC
Rev. Proc. and the DST Ruling in the DST Rul-
ing (or elsewhere), the authors believe the
proper analysis to be that the requirements enu-
merated in the TIC Rev. Proc. are irrelevant to
a DST analysis. In fact, the authors believe that
if the requirements established in the TIC Rev:
Proc. are applied to a DST, the DST will, by its
terms, fail to satisfy the requirements of the DST
Ruling.
A TIC lacks a legal entity for jointly own-
ing property, so the relationship of the co-
owners is governed by a contract. The TIC
Rev. Proc. and its various requirements
make it clear that in a TIC, the IRS is con-
cerned with the relationship of the co-own-
ers amongst themselves and amongst the
sponsors. It is testing whether a joint venture
or contractual relationship resembles a part-
nership, not just by the quantum of all
activities undertaken with respect to the real
estate, but in looking at how the parties inter-
act with each other with respect to the
finances and operation of the real estate.
Under the TIC Rev. Proc., a substantial
quantum of activities involved with rental real
estate are permitted (leasing, financing,
managing, repairs, improvements, etc.) so
long as "non-customary services" are not ren-
dered. There are, in fact, what one generally
would refer to as normal ongoing rental oper-
ations being carried on. However, the rental
operations are not the focus of the TIC Rev.
Proc. It focuses on how the parties make deci-
sions, split profits and allocate debt, and the
like.
The Service's view of testing under the DST
Ruling is very different. It will permit a look-
through of a DST for Section 1031 purposes
only if the trust qualifies as a "fixed invest-
1 He is also a friend of Richard Lipton's and consented to
the publication of this article.
'Cuff, "Exchanges, Parking Transactions and Delaware
Statutory Trust-Some New Developments under Sec-
tion 1031," 32 Real Estate Tax'n 4 (Fourth Quarter 2004).3 2002-1 CB 733.
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ment trust." The analysis assumes an entity
involvement, but fits it in a very narrow
characterization traditionally reserved for sin-
gle pools of securitized debt or stock. The rules
under Reg. 1.7701-4 look to the quantum and
scope of the activities in determining whether
the DST is a traditional trust or a trust being
used as what would otherwise be thought of
as a "business trust." It is for this reason that
the trustees' powers with respect to the real
estate are greatly limited far below what
would be necessary to carry on the type of a
rental business that was permitted for TICs
by both the TIC Rev. Proc. and Rev. Rul. 75-
374.' The concept is that the DST, to be a fixed
investment trust, must be extremely passive
and cannot undertake very normal rental activ-
ities, such as releasing the properties and refi-
nancing debt.
Contrary to Terry's assumptions, these
powers do not migrate over to the benefi-
ciaries of the DST-they just do not exist at
all. A classic trust requires that the trustees
have the power to "protect and preserve" the
property. The beneficiaries do not have any
say in the operations or control of the
trust's investment operations. Their role is
simply to receive the distributions in accor-
dance with the trust terms. Thus, the ben-
eficiaries can have no say whatsoever in the
operation and control of the DST. (This is
what in fact makes it such an excellent
vehicle from the lender's point of view,
because a bankruptcy of a beneficiary will
not affect the trust or its assets.)
As the discussion below will show, the
complete inconsistencies of the TIC Rev. Proc.
and the DST Ruling can be reconciled only by
concluding that they are mutually exclusive in
their application. That is, the IRS views them
as totally separate analytical regimes. The
rules concerning a TIC do not apply to a DST,
and vice versa.
TICs
Under the TIC Rev. Proc., the IRS generally will
issue a ruling that a TIC arrangement will be
treated as the direct ownership of an interest
in real estate, and not as an interest in a busi-
ness entity taxable as a partnership, if numer-
ous criteria have been satisfied. Direct
ownership in real estate (as a TIC) would con-
stitute an interest in property that qualifies for
a like-kind exchange under Section 1031,
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whereas an ownership interest in a business
entity could never be subject to a like-kind
exchange,
Although a complete listing of all of the
requirements of the TIC Rev. Proc. is beyond
the scope of this article,' its key requirements
include the following:
* A TIC maybe created with respect to
only one property.
Each co-owner must directly (or through
a single-member LLC) hold title to the
property.
* The number of co-owners is limited to
35.
* The co-ownership may not file a partner-
ship return, conduct business under a
common name, or hold itself out as any
other form of business entity.
* The co-owners must unanimously
approve any agreement involving the
sale, lease, financing, or management of
the property; all other agreements
require only majority approval.
• A manager cannot be hired for a period
in excess of one year, and the co-owners
cannot grant a global power of attor-
ney.
* Each co-owner must have the right to
transfer, partition, or encumber its inter-
est without the approval of any other co-
owner.
* If the property is sold, any debt encum-
bering the property must be repaid and
the net proceeds distributed to the co-
owners pro rata.
* The co-owners can make advances,
other than pro rata advances or contri-
butions, only for a limited period of
time. The co-owners can make unlim-
ited pro rata contributions with respect
to the property.
* A co-owner may have an option to
acquire an interest of other co-owners (a
call option), but a co-owner may not
acquire an option to sell its interest to the
sponsor, a lessee, or another co-owner (a
put option).
* The co-owners' activities are limited to
those customarily performed in connec-
tion with the maintenance and repaid of
real estate.
* Management and brokerage agreements
are permissible, with limitations.
* A lease cannot be entered into with a co-
owner.
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The TIC Rev. Proc. was an outgrowth of
prior cases and rulings. In Rev. Rul. 75-374,
the IRS rule that a co-ownership of real prop-
erty did no give rise to a partnership when
the co-owners performed only customary ser-
vices related to the rental of property (e.g.,
providing heat and water and removing
garbage) and did not engage in other business
activities. While this level of services is not
extensive, it is consistent with the activities
that are undertaken by owners of property.
There also were a number of cases in which
the courts found that a co-ownership either
did (or did not) rise to the level of a part-
nership.
Another important authority underlying
the TIC Rev. Proc. was Reg. 1.7701-3-the
"check the box" or "business entity" regula-
tions. These regulations determine whether
an unincorporated organization will be
treated as a business entity. If a business entity
is found to exist, it must be treated as either
a partnership or a corporation. Any domes-
tic business entity with two or more owners
that is not described in Reg. 1.7701-3 is, under
the default rule in the regulations, treated as
a partnership. Thus, every unincorporated
organization that is found to be a business
entity will be treated as a partnership for tax
purposes unless it elects to be treated as a cor-
poration.
The TIC Rev. Proc. was needed to address
the difficult question of whether the co-
ownership of property constituted a part-
nership for tax purposes, or whether TICs
could be treated as owning a direct interest
in real estate. If the former treatment applied,
the interest of each co-owner would be
viewed as a partnership interest that was not
eligible for like-kind exchange treatment
under Section 103 1(a) (2) (D). If the tenants
in common were treated as owning direct inter-
ests in real estate, however, the ownership inter-
ests could be sold or acquired in a like-kind
exchange.
It must be emphasized that the guidelines
set out in the TIC Rev. Proc. apply only when
a co-ownership that does not involve the for-
mation of a legal entity would be treated for
tax purposes as not resulting in a business
6For a thorough discussion of the TIC Rev, Proc., see Lip-
ton, "New Rules Likely to Increase Use of Tenancy-in-
Common Ownership in Like-Kind Exchanges," 96 J Tax'n
303 (May 2002).
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entity.7 If the TIC arrangement constitutes a
business entity, it is a partnership under the
default rules in Reg. 1.7701-3. If the TIC
arrangement does not give rise to a business
entity, each of the TICs is permitted to treat
the arrangement as direct ownership of an inter-
est in real property (instead of as an interest
in a partnership). Thus, the crux of the TIC Rev.
Proc. is a determination whether or not Reg.
1.7701-3 applies to a particular co-ownership
agreement.
DSTs
The most important distinction in analyzing
the tax treatments of a DST and TIC is that
the latter involves a determination of whether
the relationships and activities constitute a
partnership for tax purposes, whereas in the
DST Ruling, the existence of an entity was
assumed but the entity had to classified.
Specifically, the DST Ruling addressed whether
a trust would be treated as a trust under Reg.
1.7701-4 or would be classified as a business
entity under Reg. 1.7701-3. If a trust is clas-
sified as a trust, and also satisfies the require-
ments of Section 671, interests in the trust will
be treated as interests in the property for pur-
poses of applying Section 1031. In contrast,
if the trust is treated as a business entity, inter-
ests in the trust will be treated as interests in
a partnership or corporation (under Reg.
1.7701-3) that will not constitute valid
exchange property under Sections
103 1(a)(2)(D) and (E).
Again, a full discussion of the DST Ruling
is beyond the scope of this article.8 The DST
Ruling, however, imposed several requirements
if a trust is to be treated as satisfying the
requirements of Reg. 1.7701-4. The most
important of these requirements is that the
beneficiaries cannot be involved in the oper-
ation or management of the trust and that the
' Despite the somewhat arduous ruling guidelines provided
in the TIC Rev. Proc., numerous transactions have been
sold in the marketplace, relying on a favorable tax opin-
ion rather than a private letter ruling. Most of these deals
do not strictly comply with all of the requirements of the
TIC Rev. Proc.'s requirements Significantly, only one pri-
vate letter ruling has beer issued under the TIC Rev. Proc.
See Ltr. Rul. 200327003.8 For a thorough discussion of the DST Ruling, see Lip-
ton, Golub, and Cullen, "Delaware Statutory Trusts and
1031: A Marriage Made In Heaven or Just a Pipe Dream,"
101 J Tax'n 140 (September 2004).
'These restrictions may be relaxed somewhat in the case
of the tenant's bankruptcy or insolvency.
trustee can not have any of the powers that
have come to be known as the "seven deadly
sins'?
1. The trustee cannot dispose of the trust's
property and then acquire new property
(although the trustee can sell the trust's
assets and dissolve the trust).
2. The trustee cannot enter into new leases.
3. The trustee cannot renegotiate a lease
with an existing tenant.
4. The trustee cannot enter new debt
encumbering the trust's assets.
5. The trustee cannot renegotiate any exist-
ing debt.
6. The trustee cannot invest cash received
to profit from market fluctuations (all
cash must be invested in short-term Trea-
suries that will be distributed at the end
of each calendar quarter),
7. The trustee may not make more than
minor, non-structural modifications to
the trust's property not required by
law.
As a practical matter, these restrictions
mean that a DST can be engaged only in the
passive holding of rental real estate. It can-
not engage in the types of activities that a valid
TIC structure can engage in under the guid-
ance established in Rev. Rul. 75-374. Certainly
the trustee cannot lease, improve, re-finance,
or otherwise "operate" the real property in any
context other than the mere receipt of rental
payments. That is why it has been assumed
that DSTs will work best with property that
is subject to a long-term, triple-net lease, or
property that requires little or no action by
its owner, such as a master lease or a ground
lease. Any property that requires either active
management or foreseeable capital contri-
butions from its owner likely will be inap-
propriate for a DST. These restrictions are all
consistent with the fact that a DST is a legal
entity, but it is not treated for tax purposes
as a "business entity' because the DST will
be considered an investment trust since it will
be involved only in the passive holding of real
estate.
The prior article
The prior article contains a number of specific
statements and analyses concerning how the
rules in the TIC Rev. Proc. will be applied in
determining the tax treatment of a DST. Fun-
damentally, by assuming that both sets of
usA QUARTER 2005
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rules apply with respect to a DST, the prior arti-
cle collapsed the two types of ownership into
one, referring to "tenancies-in-common in
which a Delaware statutory trust owned the real
property." Such a simple statement is wrong
because a DST does not involve a TIC.1 A DST
is one means by which multiple persons can
collectively own an interest in real estate; a TIC
is another. Other means by which multiple indi-
viduals could collectively own an interest in real
estate include a partnership or a corporation,
neither of which would be taxed the same as
a DST or a TIC.
The prior article goes on to address the inter-
action of the TIC Rev. Proc. and the DST Rul-
ing. It states:
Curiously, the DST Ruling] seems completely obliv-
ious to the existence of ruling standards for ten-
ancies-in-common that are incorporated in [the TIC
Rev. Proc.]. It is almost as if there is a left side and
right side of the IRS that do not communicate with
one another. The [DST Rulingl is not well coor-
dinated with the [TIC Rev. Proc.).
In fact, the DST Ruling was not-and
should not have been-coordinated with the
TIC Rev. Proc. because they addressed totally
different situations. The rules for determining
whether an unincorporated organization will
be treated as a business entity versus a co-own-
ership as a TIC are completely different than
the rules for determining whether a legal
entity-a trust-will be classified as a trust or
a business entity. Put simply, the TIC Rev. Proc.
considered situations in which there was no legal
entity and the issue was whether a business
entity should be imputed, whereas the DST Rul-
ing considered situations in which there clearly
is a legal entity and the question is the classi-
fication of that legal entity as a trust versus a
business entity.
After discussing specific aspects of the
DST Ruling, the prior article then addresses,
for several pages, all of the open questions that
arise in structuring a DST that also meets or
attempts to meet the requirements of the
TIC Rev. Proc.-which requirements are, of
course, totally inapplicable. The suspect state-
ments in the prior article include the follow-
ing:
1. "A [DST] holding real property techni-
cally cannot can qualify to apply for a
private letter ruling under [the TIC Rev.
Proc], but that apparently does not pre-
clude applying for a ruling that the
arrangement is a tenancy-in-common
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for tax purposes" This statement cannot
be correct, because a DST by definition
involves a legal entity holding title to
the property, which cannot be present
in a TIC. A TIC avoids classification as a
business entity under Reg. 1.7701-3 and
also does not constitute a trust under
Reg. 1.7701-4, whereas a DST is a trust
under Reg. 1.7701-4. Thus, a DST would
never qualify for a private ruling under
the TIC Rev. Proc.
2. "Advisors nevertheless should be cau-
tious if the number of holders of benefi-
cial interest of the [DST] exceeds 35"
The 35-owner limitation is relevant for
purposes of receiving a ruling under the
TIC Rev. Proc., although there is no
direct substantive legal basis for this
limitation. It certainly has no impact
whatsoever on a DST. The IRS was con-
cerned in the TIC Rev. Proc. about
whether a co-ownership arrangement
was so large that there "must" be some
type of business entity present in a situ-
ation where one was not legally formed.
In a DST, in contrast, there is by defini-
tion a legal entity, so the ownership lim-
itation is unnecessary.
3. "[The DST Ruling] does not discuss how
decisions should be made among own-
ers of the trust interests and whether
decisions must be made by majority
decision or by unanimous decision."
This statement in the prior article
misses the fundamental point that the
owners of the beneficial interests in a
trust make no decisions. All decisions
concerning a trust and the property
owned by the trust are made by the
trustee; the beneficiaries have no deci-
sion-making power. In contrast, in a
tenancy-in-common arrangement, the
consent of each tenant is required for
every sale, lease, and re-financing,
except perhaps for immaterial deci-
sions. The two methods of ownership
are as different as night and day in this
respect-a TIC provides maximum
decision-making authority to each of
1°Cuff. supra note 2 at 6.
1 Likewise, the prior article stated that the DST Ruling
addressed situations in which a TIC could be structured
with the underlying real estate owned by a DST. Cuff,
supra note 2 at 5. In fact, the DST Ruling addresses sit-
uations in which there is no TIC.
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the co-owners to avoid partnership
status, whereas a DST provides none at
all to the beneficiaries, to support trust
status.
4. "The approval of sale of the property
is not addressed in the [DST Ruling],
although the [DST Ruling] is clear that
the trustee cannot have this authority."
This sentence contains two misstate-
ments. First, it is clear that the benefi-
ciaries have no right of approval with
respect to a sale of the property,
because only the trustee can cause
actions by a trust. Second, it also is
clear that the trustee of a DST can sell
the trust's property-the DST Ruling
only prohibits the trustee from selling
the property and re-investing the pro-
ceeds of the sale. Nothing in the DST
Ruling prohibits the trustee from sell-
ing the property owned by the trust
and distributing the proceeds of the
sale to the beneficiaries.' 2
5. "It is not clear by what vote the holders
of beneficial interests must approve a
lease or the creation or modification of
a blanket lien under the [DST Ruling].
Advisors are likely to default to the
[TIC] Rev. Proc. standard?' Again, the
DST Ruling is clear-no approval what-
soever is required or permitted from the
holders of beneficial interests in the
trust. The "unanimous approval" stan-
dard that applies to TICs is wholly inap-
posite in the case of a DST.
6. "It is not clear from the [DST Ruling]
whether decisions by the owners of ben-
eficial interest in the trust require
majority vote or unanimous vote. Advi-
sors are likely to default to the standard
of the [TIC] Rev. Proc?' See discussion
above-the owners of beneficial interest
in a DST have no vote at all, and the TIC
Rev. Proc.'s rules for TIC arrangements
do not apply to a DST.
7. "[A] dvisors likely will default again to
the standards of" the TIC Rev. Proc.
with respect to the rights of the co-
owners "to transfer, partition, and
encumber the co-owner's undivided
interest in the property without the
12If the trust owns real estate, each of the beneficiaries
would be treated as having disposed of its portion of that
real estate-
agreement or approval of any person.
The TIC Rev. Proc. requires that each
co-owner of property as a TIC be enti-
tled freely to transfer or encumber its
interest, because limitations on the
rights of ownership are more consistent
with a business entity than co-owner-
ship of property. In contrast, because
there is an entity in the case of a DST,
there is no reason why the rules in the
TIC Rev. Proc. need be applied to the
beneficial interests in a DST. Thus, the
beneficiaries of the DST could impose
whatever limitations they determine to
be appropriate on the transfer rights of
their co-beneficiaries without regard to
the requirements in the TIC Rev. Proc.
Moreover, there is no reason to restrict
transfers by the beneficiaries of a DST
as they cannot take any actions that will
hurt the other beneficiaries.
8. "[A]dvisors will endeavor to comply
with the more restrictive standards of
either the [TIC Rev. Proc. or the DST
Ruling] on questions of management or
brokerage agreements, disbursing rev-
enue, obtaining or modifying insur-
ance, negotiating lease modifications,
negotiating indebtedness modifica-
tions, and manager and brokerage fees?'
Again, the TIC Rev. Proc. will play no
role. The trustee of the DST can enter
intoa long-term management agree-
ment for a manager of the property,
provided that the management agree-
ment does not involve a sharing of net
income or loss (which could result in a
deemed partnership between the DST
and the manager). Moreover, the
trustee of the DST is not permitted to
have the power to engage in any of the
seven deadly sins-let alone actually do
so-including leasemodifications and
negotiating indebtedness. Put simply,
the rules for DST and TICs are com-
pletely different, so that the "more
restrictive standard" approach is not
correct.
9. "Advisors presumably will seek to sat-
isfy the standards of the [TIC] Rev.
Proc." with respect to leases, percentage
rent, the lenders, payments to sponsors,
etc. In this case, the analysis in the prior
article might be wrong, but the conclu-
sion is likely correct. Advisors of a DST
1" QUARTER 2005
AS A
PRACTICAL
MATTER, A DST
CAN BE
ENGAGED ONLY
IN THE PASSIVE
HOLDING OF
RENTAL REAL
ESTATE.
DSTS ANMD Tfrs REMl ESTAT3E TAXATION
will want to make sure that the DST is
not deemed to be engaged in a partner-
ship with either the lessee of the prop-
erty or any sponsor. So the
requirements of the TIC Rev. Proc.,
which basically restricts TICs from
entering into arm's-length arrangements
with lessees and sponsors (and property
managers), will likely be employed by a
prudent trustee as well. In most cases, of
course, a DST will involve a long-term
net lease of property (or a property that
is subject to a long-term master lease),
so the types of issues that frequently
arise in a TIC environment simply will
not come up in the context of a DST.
10. "[I]t would be inadvisable for [a DST]
to undertake business under a common
name." Why? A DST is an entity,
whereas a TIC is not. Thus, because it
is an entity, a DST can operate under a
common name. It simply must be pas-
sive in the way in which the property is
operated.
There are many other places in the prior arti-
cle where a comparison is made between the
rules for DSTs on the one hand and TICs on the
other, and the suggestion is made that the "more
restrictive" of the two rules should be applied.
Presumably Terrywas concerned that a revenue
agent will not understand the distinction
between a DST and a TIC. But the distinction
between DSTs and TICs is not like one of apples
and oranges, which are different but are both
fruit. A DST and a TIC are more like a steak and
broccoli. They both are ways to hold property
for multiple owners (i.e., in this analogy, they
both are food), and they both create a means
to qualify for a like-kind exchange (they could
be viewed as part of the same menu), but that
is where the similarity ends. The rules for one
simply do not apply to the other.
Conclusion
It is a rare day when Terry Cuff makes a mis-
take. Unfortunately, his analysis in the prior arti-
cle appears to have gotten off on the wrong foot,
and the fundamental theoretical flaw-that the
rules for TICs are applicable to DSTs-infects
much of the analysis in the prior article. In fact,
the rules for DSTs are separate and apart from
the rules for TICs, and practitioners need to con-
sider the different types of ownership structures
that are available in order to determine which
rules apply. A DST can be used by multiple per-
sons as a legal entity to own title to real prop-
erty (which is something that many lenders like),
but the activities of the DST are extremely lim-
ited. In contrast, a TIC arrangement can be used
by multiple persons to own property without
a legal entity, but the restrictions in the TIC Rev.
Proc. and the case law concerning TIC arrange-
ments would be applicable. Either method
can be used to allow multiple persons to own
interests in the same real estate in a manner that
would not invalidate a like-kind exchange of
real estate. U
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